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(viii)  Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military rea-
sons so demand;137  
                                                                                                                        
2. Matthew Happold, “Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court”, in José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser and M. Cherif Bassiouni (eds.), 
The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Memory of Igor Blischen-
ko, Brill, Leiden, 2009.  
3. Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 
2009. 
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137  Article 8(2)(e)(viii), parallel to Article 8(2)(b)(viii), prohibits the displacement of the civilian 
population in the context of a non-international armed conflict, unless the security of the civil-
ians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. This conduct is prohibited under the 
same terms in Article 17 Additional Protocol II and reflects customary international humanitari-
an law (Rule 129 of the ICRC Study, see also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005). 
The ICC Elements of Crimes clarify that to prove the war crime of displacing a civilian 
population it is necessary that 1) the perpetrator ordered a displacement of a civilian population; 
2) such an order was not justified by the security of the civilians involved or by military necessi-
ty; 3) the perpetrator was in a position to effect such displacement by giving such order; 4) the 
conduct took place in the context and was associated with a non-international armed conflict; 
and 5) the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict. 
The term “displacement” shall be interpreted in light of international humanitarian law as to 
include the evacuation of the civilian population both within and outside the national territory. 
Article 17(2) AP II proscribes the displacement of civilians outside their national territory. 
Differently from the wording used in the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes refer to the 
displacement of ”a civilian population” as opposed to “the civilian population”. This discrepan-
cy shall be construed as to criminalise conducts of displacement of civilians not necessarily in-
volving the whole civilian population (on the point, cf. Dörmann, 2003, p. 473). 
However, the number of civilians involved in the displacement shall exceed individual oc-
currences. This results from the systemic reading of the Elements of Crimes where, for example, 
Article 8(2)(a)(vii) refers to “one or more persons” as opposed to “a civilian population” (cf. 
Dörmann, 2003, p. 472). Arguably, since the letter of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) does not resort to the 
same expression, only the civilian population and not individual civilians shall be affected by 
the displacement in order for the conduct to fall under the scope of the provision. This proposi-
tion finds support in the travaux préparatoires to the ICC Statute where the expression “civilian 
population” was deliberately chosen against the “one or more civilians” as the drafters consid-
ered the displacement of one civilian to be insufficient to constitute the war crime of displace-
ment of civilians (Dörmann, 2003, p. 472).  
A salient issue which has been recently elucidated by the ICC case law relates to the exist-
ence of an actual order to displace a civilian population as a constitutive element of the war 
crime under Article 8(2)(e)(viii). In the case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber has clarified what follows: 
the conduct by which the perpetrator(s) force(s) civilians to leave a certain area is not 
limited to an order, as referred to in element 1 of the relevant Elements of Crimes. The 
Chamber considers that, should this not be the case, the actual circumstances of civilian 
displacement in the course of an armed conflict would be unduly restricted. This is spe-
cifically reflected in the general introduction to the Elements of Crimes, which states 
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(ix)  Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;138  
                                                                                                                        
that “[t]he elements […] apply ‘mutatis mutandis’ to all those whose criminal responsi-
bility may fall under Articles 25 and 28 of the Statute” (Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC 
PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 
2014, para. 64). 
Nothing in the Elements of Crimes indicates the nature of the position which the alleged perpe-
trator has to cover in order to effect the displacement of civilians under Article 8(2)(e)(viii). Yet, 
the wording “to effect the displacement” seems to privilege a de facto appraisal of such a posi-
tion. Therefore, both de jure and de facto positions can be reasonably contemplated under the 
terms of the provision. This finds support in the pronouncement of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the 
case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntagan-
da, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 2014, para. 68) stating “the means used […] and the modus 
operandi show that the UPC/FPLC soldiers were in a position to displace civilians, as further 
demonstrated by the large number of civilians who were in fact displaced”. 
Article 8(2)(e)(viii) admits the displacement of a civilian population for reasons connected 
to the conflict only in two exceptional circumstances: 1. When the security of the civilians in-
volved so demands, (for example, when the civilians are located in areas likely to be subjected 
to bombings; 2. When imperative military reasons so demand, where the term “imperative” im-
poses a restrictive interpretation of this exception (Dörmann, 2003, pp. 474–75).  
Cross-references:  
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138  Treachery, also synonymous with perfidy, involves a breach of good faith of the combatant 
adversaries. In practice, it is typically cases in which the accused in deception claims a right to 
protection for him or herself, and uses this for his or her advantage in the combat. It includes: 
 pretending to be a civilian;  
 fake use of a flag of truce, the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or 
of the United  
 Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions; 
 fake use of the protective emblem of cultural property; 
 fake use of other internationally recognised protective emblems, signs or signals;  
 pretending to surrender; 
 pretending to be incapacitated by wounds or sickness; 
 pretending to belong to the enemy by the use of their signs. 
The provision is similar, but not identical to Article 8(2)(b)(xi). The prohibition on perfidy 
in the present only extends to “combatant adversaries”, while Article 8(2)(b)(xi) also prohibits 
the killing and wounding of civilians. The use of the notion “combatant adversary” should be 
distinguished from “enemy combatants”, indicating that there is notion “combatant” is not ap-
